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The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is a pressurized light-water reactor with a design thermal
power of 250 MW. The principal function of the ATR is to provide a high neutron flux for 
testing reactor fuels and other materials. The reactor also provides other irradiation services such
as radioisotope production. The ATR and its support facilities are located at the Test Reactor 
Area of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL).
An audit conducted by the Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance (DOE OA) raised concerns that design conditions at the ATR were not 
adequately analyzed in the safety analysis and that legacy design basis management practices
had the potential to further impact safe operation of the facility.1 The concerns identified by the 
audit team, and issues raised during additional reviews performed by ATR safety analysts, were
evaluated through the unreviewed safety question process resulting in shutdown of the ATR for
more than three months while these concerns were resolved. 
Past management of the ATR safety basis, relative to facility design basis management and
change control, led to concerns that discrepancies in the safety basis may have developed.
Although not required by DOE orders or regulations, not performing design basis verification in 
conjunction with development of the 10 CFR 830 Subpart B upgraded safety basis allowed these 
potential weaknesses to be carried forward. Configuration management and a clear definition of 
the existing facility design basis have a direct relation to developing and maintaining a high
quality safety basis which properly identifies and mitigates all hazards and postulated accident 
conditions. These relations and the impact of past safety basis management practices have been
reviewed in order to identify lessons learned from the safety basis upgrade process and 
appropriate actions to resolve possible concerns with respect to the current ATR safety basis.
The need for a design basis reconstitution program for the ATR has been identified along with 
the use of sound configuration management principles in order to support safe and efficient
facility operation.
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Department of Energy Audit Summary
The Department of Energy's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (DOE
OA) conducted an audit in August 2003 of the environmental, safety, and health management at
the INEEL.1 The audit included an in-depth review of the ATR Emergency Firewater Injection
System and the Firewater Supply System. Concerns identified by the DOE OA audit team and 
issues raised during additional evaluations performed by ATR safety analysts resulted in multiple
positive unreviewed safety question determinations and shutdown of the ATR while the specific
concerns identified were resolved. The issues included:
x Potential emergency firewater injection system time delay increase,
x Firewater supply system modeling issues, 
x Potential deficiencies identified during system interaction walkdowns, and 
x Potentially inadequate component supports identified during seismic walkdowns.
The DOE OA team acknowledged the presence of a number of positive aspects with respect to 
current management of the facility. For example, the ATR staff was credited with being
knowledgeable of key plant design specifications, with being highly motivated, and showing
ownership of responsibilities. However, the audit team reported that the ATR had "several design
deficiencies that were not adequately analyzed in the safety analysis" and that "weaknesses in
configuration management, surveillance testing, and maintenance have the potential to further
reduce the margin of safety." The audit team recognized that resource allocations in past years
(e.g., not previously funding a design reconstitution) may have contributed to these conditions 
and that this possibility would be reexamined. The team concluded that the "identified design
analysis weaknesses warrant a detailed evaluation of the specific concerns and a management
review to determine why these concerns were not previously identified, including the underlying
factors that may reduce the effectiveness of engineering evaluations and safety analyses."
The specific deficiencies identified by the audit team and ATR safety analysts were addressed,
and the ATR resumed operation in late November 2003.
Advanced Test Reactor Safety Basis Evolution
The DOE OA team raised questions with respect to the ATR safety basis upgrade in that the
requirements and scope may have allowed legacy weaknesses in the safety basis to be carried
forward. The original ATR safety basis was documented in a safety analysis report (SAR) dated 
April 1965.2 The 1965 SAR was not maintained beyond the first few years. The ATR Plant 
Protection System and Technical Specifications Design Basis Report3 (DBR) was later prepared
to support design of an upgraded plant protection system. The DBR contained accident analyses
that supported the performance requirements (setpoints and response times) for the plant 
protection system, which includes the reactor shutdown system and engineered safety features.
The DBR was maintained as a configuration controlled document, with periodic updates, and 
served as the facility accident analyses from 1976 until the Upgraded Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) was completed and implemented.4
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The upgraded safety basis for the ATR was prepared in response to DOE Orders, and now
regulations, for upgrading and maintaining the safety basis of a DOE nuclear facility. The
UFSAR was prepared following the format and content guidance of Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.70.5 The upgraded safety basis was approved by DOE
in 1996, and implemented in 1998.4 The selection of Regulatory Guide 1.70 proved to be prudent
since this document was subsequently identified as the safe harbor standard for a DOE reactor in 
Appendix A to 10 CFR 830 Subpart B. The ATR UFSAR was later approved by DOE under 10 
CFR 830 Subpart B in November 2001. The UFSAR has been maintained via the annual update
process as required by current DOE regulations.
DOE requirements and guidance did not require that facility design basis verification be
performed as part of developing the upgraded safety basis. That is, there was no specific 
requirement to verify or reconstitute the design basis of a reactor facility within 10 CFR 830 
Subpart B or through application of Regulatory Guide 1.70 as the safe harbor standard. There
also was no such requirement imposed previously through DOE Order 5480.23.6
The initial ATR safety basis upgrade project scope included review of the facility design basis
and performance of the structures, systems, and components. However, limited funding available
for the upgrade and the apparent lack of a clear requirement resulted in the design basis 
reconstitution scope being cut from the project. Note DOE Standard 1073-937, recently updated
as DOE Standard 1073-20038, provided guidance for performing design basis reconstitution;
however, it did not represent a requirement to perform such an activity. DOE Order 420.1A9,
which currently requires documents that define the design basis and supporting documents be 
compiled and kept current, was not issued until well after implementation of the UFSAR.
Safety Basis and Design Basis Management
DOE Order 420.1A requires that documents that define a system’s design basis and supporting
design information documents be complied and kept current using a formal change control/work
control program. If the design basis is not clearly defined, the Order requires identification of 
system requirements and performance criteria essential to performance of the system’s safety
function, the basis for the requirements, and how the current system configuration satisfies the 
requirements and criteria. This is necessary to support various plant activities, including design
control and configuration management. Design codes and standards have evolved significantly
over the 40-year life of the ATR. Efforts to demonstrate facility safety by comparison to modern
design codes and standards and the lack of a definitive back-fit policy applicable within the DOE 
complex, have resulted in a piecemeal application of new codes and standards. This piecemeal
application of updated codes and standards, combined with the long operating history, has 
resulted in a patchwork of supporting design information documentation that is at best confusing.
Hence, the ATR lacks a clearly defined and controlled design basis and supporting design
information baseline and is not in department order compliance.4
As concluded by the DOE OA team, the lack of a clear baseline has led to potential weaknesses
in the facility safety basis. Therefore, a design basis reconstitution program is necessary that will 
reestablish the facility design basis and supporting design information documentation. In
addition to reestablishing the baseline design basis documentation important to the safety
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function of structures and systems, the functionality of the safety structures and systems needs to
be defined and validated.
Design Basis Reconstitution Program Summary
Reconstitution of the design basis will be accomplished through the following elements of the
ATR design basis reconstitution program.4
Identification of Design Basis Requirements:  This element involves identification of system
requirements and performance criteria essential to the system's or structure's performance of its 
safety function based on the UFSAR, Technical Safety Requirements, and supporting technical
documentation.
Configuration Validation:  This element involves walkdowns of the structures and systems to 
compare the as-built facility to the design basis and supporting design documentation. Any
discrepancy identified during this phase that indicates the system or structure configuration is not 
consistent with the safety basis will be evaluated using the unreviewed safety question process.
Functionality Validation:  This element involves defining the system functional requirements
that are essential to safety based on the UFSAR, Technical Safety Requirements, and related 
technical documentation. The design basis and supporting design information will be assessed to 
determine that the defined functionality is supported by surveillance tests, system operational
tests, manufacturer specifications, etc. 
Populate the Configuration Management System:  Design basis documents and supporting
design information identified by the requirement identification element will be entered into a
configuration management database. Missing information will be identified and tracked for
future action.
ATR UFSAR Validation:  This element will review the UFSAR for compliance with regulatory
requirements and requirements from departmental orders. The UFSAR analyses will be reviewed
for verification that the UFSAR addresses all design basis accidents, the analyzed accident
sequences are complete and appropriate, and certified computer codes have been used in the 
accident analysis.
Corrective Action Planning:  This element of the program involves planning corrective actions to 
mitigate weaknesses identified during the design basis reconstitution program. A resolution plan
will be developed for identified items.
The ATR design basis reconstitution plan is based on DOE guidance plus experience and
guidance from similar programs conducted at commercial nuclear power plants. Note that most 
commercial nuclear power plants completed equivalent efforts without experiencing long-term
facility shutdown while identified issues were resolved. The discovery of potential safety
concerns through the ATR design basis reconstitution program will be addressed through the
USQ process as noted above.
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Elements of Successful Configuration Management
The importance of configuration management was not recognized during the early years of the 
nuclear industry. Designers were concerned with meeting design requirements and producing
documents that could be used by construction organizations to build the facility. The knowledge
of the design basis was not effectively transferred with the documents and commercial utilities
had neither the experience nor information to establish long-term design maintenance processes.
Indicators of a growing disconnect between the design basis and the physical plant became
apparent in the late 1970’s and received intermittent attention through subsequent years.10 A 
more recent and heavily publicized configuration management event occurred in 1996 and 
culminated with shutdown of the three Millstone units. This occurrence led to the NRC issuing a
10 CFR 50.54(f) letter to all license holders of nuclear reactors.
The value of the ATR design basis reconstitution program must be realized through a continuing
commitment to sound configuration management. Configuration management aims to establish 
and maintain consistency between the facility design requirements, the technical documentation
supporting facility operation (e.g., safety basis), and the facility “as-built” configuration.11
Achieving consistency among design requirements, physical configuration, and facility
documentation provides a foundation for safe and efficient operation. Six basic elements of a
successful configuration management program include11:
Program Management: Development and implementation of a configuration management 
program requires prioritizing, direction, and monitoring.
Design Requirements:  The design requirements (and functional requirements) associated with 
the facility structures, systems and components need to be established, documented, 
communicated and maintained.
Information Control:  Facility configuration information (including document and electronic
information control) related to the physical configuration and the design requirements must be 
identified and managed.
Change Control:  Consistency among the design requirements, the physical configuration, and 
the facility documentation as changes are made is maintained.
Assessments:  The effectiveness of the configuration management, with emphasis on the product, 
is evaluated. 
Training:  Facility personnel are made aware of the configuration management vision, concepts, 
and procedures such that they are able to carry out their work in a manner that supports 
successful configuration management.
The most important element of configuration management is change control, which goes well 
beyond keeping records of facility modifications.11 Change control is essential such that all
facility changes are appropriately addressed and incorporated into the safety basis, thereby
maintaining a sound basis for continued facility operation. With respect to the ATR safety basis, 
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not maintaining the 1965 SAR and subsequently building on that original documentation resulted 
in weaknesses within the upgraded safety basis. The cost of lost operating time in addition to 
future costs of reviewing and reestablishing the design and safety basis are extensive.
ATR Safety Basis Upgrade Lessons Learned
Existing weaknesses in the ATR safety basis were unknowingly carried forward into the 
upgraded safety basis. Change control practices and documentation show a strong ability to 
record and trace modifications to the ATR. Modifications have not been captured as well in 
facility drawings or in the safety basis documents. The condition of the ATR safety basis has 
been further impacted by the evolution of codes and standards over the 40-year life of the facility
and the resulting patchwork of design information. The original ATR safety analysis report and
the design basis report were assumed to be a reliable source of information forming the baseline
for development the upgraded safety basis. No detailed validation or walk-down of the 
functionality of systems and structures, as described in these documents, was performed.4
The decision to not perform any type of design basis verification or reconstitution in conjunction 
with developing the upgraded safety basis led to a more than three-month unplanned reactor
shutdown at an approximate cost of three million dollars per month in lost productivity. The 
costs due to lost productivity are separate from the costs of performing a design basis 
reconstitution, and may have been avoided through a more comprehensive safety basis upgrade
scope. A design basis reconstitution must now be performed under much less favorable
circumstances, with greater scrutiny, and at greater direct cost than may otherwise have been
required. The cost of recovering the design basis may also exceed the cost of continuous 
maintenance through sound configuration management.
Some concerns raised by the DOE OA team resulted directly from similar conditions
experienced by commercial nuclear plants. Although ATR is very different from the design of 
typical power reactors, closer attention to industry events and regulatory notifications could have 
led to these concerns being identified and addressed in a more timely manner. The ATR design
basis reconstitution effort includes development of a system/process to access, screen and review
nuclear reactor and power plant operating experience in order to aid timely assessment of
lessons-learned that could be important for continued safe operation of the ATR.4
The benefits of good configuration management are not always clear and can become the victim 
of internal efforts to reduce cost. This tends to drive a cyclic condition. A benefit of the NRC 
10 CFR 50.54(f) letter, at least in the present, has been to solidify the importance of
configuration management in the commercial nuclear power industry.10 A commitment to 
continuous configuration management that ensures consistency between design requirements,
physical configuration, and facility documentation is essential to maintaining a firm basis for 
safe and efficient operation. The ATR design basis reconstitution effort emphasizes the 
importance of continuous design basis management by populating a design basis database that 
can be a tool for long-term configuration management.
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Conclusions
The impact on the facility safety basis due to not maintaining the early SAR and the patchwork
approach to applying updated codes and standards which resulted in potential weaknesses in the
safety basis was not recognized when preparing the upgraded safety basis. The decision to 
exclude the design basis verification scope from the safety basis upgrade project led to these 
weaknesses being carried forward into the new safety basis. Discovery of this condition, through
a DOE OA audit and reviews by ATR safety analysts resulted in shutdown of the ATR for more
than three months at a cost of approximately three million dollars per month in lost productivity.
A design basis reconstitution program must be performed under much less favorable
circumstances and likely, at greater direct cost than would have been required if performed in 
conjunction with the safety basis upgrade project.
Although the design of the ATR is unique, issues and lessons-learned identified within the 
commercial nuclear power industry can be applicable to the ATR. The ATR design basis 
reconstitution effort includes development of a system/process to access, screen and review
nuclear reactor power plant operating experience in order to aid timely assessment of lessons-
learned and assist continued safe operation of the ATR.
Sound configuration management that achieves consistency among design requirements,
physical configuration, and facility documentation provides a foundation for safe and efficient
facility operation. Configuration management requires steady performance in order to avoid 
potentially greater recovery costs.
The design basis reconstitution program is underway at ATR. 
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